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ABSTRACT9
This paper describes and illustrates a methodology to conduct post-flood investigations10
based on interdisciplinary collaboration between social and physical scientists. The method,11
designed to explore the link between crisis behavioral response and hydro-meteorological12
dynamics, aims at understanding the spatial and temporal capacities and constraints on13
human behaviors in fast evolving hydro-meteorological conditions. It builds on methods14
coming from both geosciences and transportations studies to complement existing post-15
flood field investigation methodology used by hydro-meteorologists. We propose an interview16
framework, structured around a chronological guideline to allow people who experienced the17
flood first hand to tell the stories of the circumstances in which their activities were affected18
during the flash flood.19
This paper applies our data collection method to the case of the June 15th 2010 flash20
flood event that killed 26 persons in the Draguignan area (Var, France). As a first step,21
based on the collected narratives, an abductive approach allowed us to identify the possi-22
ble factors influencing individual responses to flash floods. As a second step, behavioral23
responses were classified into categories of activities based on the respondents’ narratives.24
Then, we propose a spatial and temporal analysis of the sequences made of the categories of25
action to contextualize the set of coping responses with respect to local hydro-meteorological26
conditions. During this event, the respondents mostly follow the pace of change in their local27
environmental conditions as the flash flood occurs, official flood anticipation being rather28
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limited and based on a large scale weather watch. Therefore, contextual factors appear as29
strongly influencing the individual’s ability to cope with the event in such a situation.30
2
1. Introduction31
Western Mediterranean regions are favored locations for Heavy Precipitating Events. In32
recent years, many of them resulted in destructive floods with extended damage and loss of33
life including flash floods in France in Nıˆmes in 1988, Vaison-la-Romaine in 1992, the Aude34
in 1999 and the Gard in 2002 and 2005 (Delrieu et al. 2005; Gaume et al. 2004). On 15-1635
June 2010, the vicinity of the town of Draguignan (Fig. 1), located in the Var department136
was hit by a violent storm. The daily accumulated rainfall reached 200 and 300 mm over,37
respectively, 2000 and 250 km2 and led to important flash flooding (Rouzeau et al. 2010).38
According to these authors this event is one of the 20 most important flash flood events39
reported since the 1950’s in the western part of the French Mediterranean coast. Since the40
last destructive flood occurred in Draguignan in 1827 there was no contemporary memory41
of that event.42
The rainfall event of June 15th, 2010 was particularly intense (Fig. 2). The maximum43
rain amount recorded at the Me´te´o-France station of “Les Arcs-sur-Argens” reached 400 mm44
in 24 hours (including 330 mm in less than 10 hours) (Fig. 3). These values largely exceed45
a return period of 100-years (Martin 2010). Two periods of the 2010 event can be seen.46
During the first one, the atmospheric flux came from S-SW and lead to intense precipitation47
but it quickly swept nearly the entire Var department (up to 16h local time). During the48
second period, the flow was oriented SE and precipitation stayed quasi-stationary over the49
Nartuby watershed upstream Draguignan (184 km2) (after 16h local time).50
1Administrative division of France between the region and the commune, equivalent to 3 to 4 times the
median land area of a US county.
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The predictability of such phenomena remains low in terms of rainfall intensity and51
location. In this case study, the rivers responsible for the inundation were not part of the52
operational river monitoring system managed by the regional flood warning service (Service53
de Pre´vision des Crues Me´diterrane´e Est: SPC-ME). This is partly because flood forecasting54
of such quick response catchments remains a scientific challenge. Therefore, only the Me´te´o55
France vigilance map was available to warn the inhabitants of the department for heavy56
rainfall and potential flooding. Based on the rainfall forecast Me´te´o France broadcasted the57
heavy rainfall watch (Me´te´o-France orange vigilance, 3rd level of warning over a maximum of58
4) on Monday, June 14th at 11pm. The 24-hour ahead forecast predicted daily rain amount59
from 80 to 150 mm for the day of the storm (with a max of about 250 mm). The orange60
vigilance launched the day before concerned 11 French departments (i.e. 60000 km2) and61
then, 6 departments (32000 km2) in the morning of the storm day. The warning level that62
is issued when the daily forecasted precipitation is greater than 200 mm was never reached63
so the red vigilance was not issued.64
This event was responsible for the death of 26 persons and damages were evaluated at65
1 billion euros. 2450 persons were rescued, including 1350 who were airlifted and 300 who66
escaped very perilous situations (Rouzeau et al. 2010). Three municipalities experienced the67
most part of the fatal accidents: Draguignan (10), Trans en Provence (5) and Roquebrune68
(5). As often in case of flash flooding, the circumstances of the accidents are nearly evenly69
distributed into two categories: on the one hand the casualties happening inside buildings70
(13 cases over 26) and mostly affecting elderly (average age= 68; median age=79); and on the71
other hand, the ones occurring on the road when walking or driving (13/26) affecting younger72
people (average age= 52; median age=56) and especially males (9 men and 4 women) (Vinet73
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et al. 2012). The way age and circumstances were distributed has already been observed for74
the 2002 flash flood event in the Gard region in France (Ruin et al. 2008). This paper also75
indicates a possible link between the accidents’ circumstances, the age of the victims and76
the flood dynamics related to the scale of the upstream drainage area.77
Even with such heavy death toll, the consequences could have been even more dramatic78
considering the violence of the floods, the lack of flood alerts and the significant damage in79
the vicinity of Draguignan. Actually, the timing of the flood corresponds to rush hours for80
most of the municipalities. In the small surrounding village of Figanie`res for instance, the81
residents felt lucky that the peak flow in the main street happened 15 minutes after schools82
dismissed their students for the day.83
This flash flood event offers a typical example to study the relation between the flood84
dynamics and the social response in the context of a sudden worsening of the environment.85
Flash floods differ from slow rise riverine floods. With flash floods, the time of peak flows86
in the different rivers across the storm area may vary a lot according to the structure and87
motion of the convective storm (more than propagation in rivers). This asynchronicity of88
peak flows seems to be a significant source of danger (Creutin et al. 2013). It forces cri-89
sis managers and/or individuals to adapt to rapid evolution of local conditions in a way90
different from standard emergency response to riverine floods. In the case of the storm of91
June 15th, 2010 (that we call the Draguignan case hereafter) the rapidity of the river rise92
and the lack of anticipation of authorities compelled many individuals and communities to93
organize themselves to cope locally with the event. The flood happened so quickly that94
some communities didn’t have time to even access rescue services. Nevertheless, individuals95
and improvised groups managed to inform, organize and protect themselves on their own,96
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without any official involvement (Parker and Handmer 1998; Creutin et al. 2009). Investigat-97
ing human and environmental circumstances of personal stories experienced by individuals98
and groups in such a crisis is key to learning more about the link between environmental99
conditions and social settings. To better learn from those positive cases and to consider100
the influence of environmental conditions versus social settings we need to investigate the101
various circumstances of such successful adaptation. Why and when did people change their102
behaviors when faced with the quickly changing environmental conditions?103
This paper describes and illustrates a new methodology to conduct post-event field inves-104
tigations based on interdisciplinary collaboration between social and physical scientists. Past105
experience shows that post-flood investigation methodologies have been developed for diverse106
purposes. For example, local and national authorities conduct such legal/administrative in-107
vestigations to officially answer public concerns about the cause and impacts of floods (Lefrou108
et al. 2000; Huet et al. 2003; Hornus and Martin 2005; Rouzeau et al. 2010). Operational109
services like the US Geological Survey or the National Weather Service, conduct “service110
assessments”. Research institutions also investigate extreme events after they occur (Gaume111
et al. 2004; Delrieu et al. 2005; Gaume and Borga 2008; Martin 2010; Douvinet et al. 2011;112
Payrastre et al. 2012). However, post-flood collaborations between social and physical sci-113
entists remain rare. The few examples of multi-disciplinary work, when examined closely,114
are not integrated collaborative projects but patchwork quilts of a variety of specialists who115
study separate aspects of an event. In this flood study arena, true integration of information,116
data and knowledge from different fields is lacking with the result that neither the physical117
nor the social science perspectives gain a comprehensive picture of the extreme event. This118
paper attempts to demonstrate that integration of physical and social concerns under the119
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form of common research questions and methodology is possible and useful.120
This paper is organized in 5 sections. Section 2 explains the interdisciplinary research121
questions, purpose and theoretical background. Section 3 investigates the possible causes of122
individual responses based on the analysis of the narratives. Section 4 shows the preliminary123
results of the analysis based on a space-time framework pertinent to compare the dynamics124
of both the natural phenomena and the social response. Finally, conclusions and implications125
for future research are reported in Section 5.126
2. Purpose and theoretical background127
a. Contextual factors: a key question to understand individual responses128
Post-event investigations of the 2007 floods in England (Pitt 2008), Xynthia (Leonard129
2010), and flash flooding in the Var region (Rouzeau et al. 2010) in France highlighted130
serious breakdowns in the warning-response system. Nevertheless, the literature on the131
factors influencing individual and societal responses to such early warnings remains weak132
(Mileti 1995; Drabek 1986, 2000; Sorensen 2000; Parker et al. 2009). Lindell and Perry133
(1992, 2004) developed a Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) of residents’ responses134
to hurricane warnings as a composite of new information and environmental cues combined135
with pre-existing beliefs based on past experience. Their model of agent response helpfully136
incorporates the temporal dimension, in terms of individual experience, forecast lead-time,137
and the time required for evacuation and other protective action. Nevertheless, it is a-spatial138
and ignores contextual factors such as neighborhood effects on individual responsiveness139
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(Parker and Handmer 1998) as well as the potential for emergent effects. However, other140
works has highlighted the importance of these contextual factors, such as the timing of an141
event (i.e. middle of the night v. midday) within the rhythms of everyday life (Ruin 2010),142
as key influences on individual and institutional responses to warnings. These individual and143
institutional responses are defined as multi-scalar and nonlinear and involve what has been144
called “socially distributed cognition” (Dash and Gladwin 2007) in which, as the FLOODsite145
project concluded, “context is everything in understanding flood warning response” (Parker146
et al. (2009) p. 104).147
Thus, based on several studies performed in Europe concerning social responses to flood-148
ing, Parker et al. define two categories of contextual factors influencing the responses to flood149
warning: physical characteristics and social circumstances (Parker et al. 2009). Among phys-150
ical characteristics, the severity of the flood and the time available between the warning and151
the flood appear as the most important factors on social responses. Concerning social char-152
acteristics, people experience, their knowledge concerning flood risk and the distribution of153
responsibility for responding to flooding are identified as the main influencing factors for154
floods.155
Because of the suddenness in the rise of water levels and the spatial dispersion of the156
possible impacts, timely flash floods warning (official warning) is limited and insufficient157
(Borga et al. 2011). Flash floods often surprise people in the midst of their daily activity158
and force them to react in a very limited amount of time. In such fast evolving events,159
impacts depend not just on such compositional variables as the magnitude of the flood160
event and the vulnerability of those affected, but also on such contextual factors as its161
location and timing. Depending on contingent conditions (e.g. at night when it is difficult162
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to see, rush hours when there are errands to run and children to pick up and lots of other163
cars on the road, or working hours when people feel they must be at work regardless of164
the conditions) perception of environmental cues needed for self-warning may be hindered.165
Likewise, the nature and dynamics of the individuals’ reactions will differ according to the166
location and activity they were performing when they felt the need for action, and their167
capability to connect with their relatives or to have social interactions allowing a group168
response (Gruntfest 1977; Mileti 1995; Drabek 2000; Lindell and Perry 2004). Those specific169
contextual factors can alter the scale and social distribution of impacts and vulnerability170
to them. In the case of flooding fatalities, for instance, the elderly are often said to be the171
most vulnerable (Parker et al. 2009), but when fatalities are mapped against basin size and172
response time, it has been shown that in fact it is young adults who are most likely to be173
killed in flash flooding of small catchments, whereas the elderly are the most frequent victim174
of large scale fluvial flooding (Ruin et al. 2008).175
Further investigations in the Gard region in France, where social response to flash flood176
was examined in detail, have shown that such tendency could be explained by a difference177
of attitude across ages with respect to mobility related to daily life routine and constraints178
(Ruin 2010). Even if this appears as a tendency in both the analysis of limited data on death179
circumstances and intended behavior surveys, behavioral verification is very much needed.180
Collecting data on actual behavioral responses or practices in the context of hardly pre-181
dictable extreme weather events is a challenging problem. Participant observations are not182
possible for evident reasons. Indirect observations using sensors or videos poses the ques-183
tions of the quantity and spatial distribution of the observation devices, the quality and184
completeness of the data they provide and their robustness in extreme conditions. Even for185
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hydrological purposes such devices are often overwhelmed and/or unreliable in flash flood-186
ing conditions (Gaume and Borga 2008). The observation and understanding of individual187
behaviors requires more qualitative methods, already broadly used when studying the in-188
teractions between society and environment in the context of global change (Walters and189
Vayda 2009; Goldman et al. 2011). The understanding of decision-making processes in flood-190
ing situations is improving through empirical studies using ad hoc survey methods. Although191
many efforts lead this way, a holistic comprehension of the main contributing factors is still192
challenging because of the heterogeneity of the methods used (Parker et al. 2009). This193
paper contributes to this effort, proposing an “event-based methodology” (Walters 2012) to194
collect data in the context of post flood investigations.195
One of the main goals is to understand why people decide to travel in hazardous weather196
conditions and how they adapt (or not) their activities and schedule in response to en-197
vironmental perturbations. This requires an integrated approach, sensitive to the spatial198
and temporal dynamics of geophysical hazards and responses to them (Drobot and Parker199
2007; Morss et al. 2011). Coupled Human And Natural Systems (CHANS) approach offers200
an interesting theoretical background for the analysis of interactions between environment201
and society (Liu et al. 2007). In particular, the spatio-temporal framework proposed by202
Holling (2001) constitutes an interesting tool for integrating both physical and social fac-203
tors involved in the individual response to flash flood. Its multiple scales perspective allows204
taking into account the variability of these factors depending on both the dynamic of the205
hydro-meteorological event and the dynamic of social response (Ruin et al. 2008; Creutin206
et al. 2009, 2013).207
In the case of flash floods, the time available to “anticipate” the danger varies dramati-208
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cally in space and according to the size of the drainage area upstream the point of interest.209
In general, as catchment size decreases, the delay between rainfall and flood peak decreases.210
More importantly, the shorter this delay is the faster the water level rises in the river. In211
addition the absolute time of danger outburst varies in space according to storm characteris-212
tics and the appropriateness of individual and group response across space scales is hard to213
assess (Creutin et al. 2009, 2013). For instance, the timeliness of a reaction may be perfect214
at a point within a large basin while the same reaction performed at the same time at a215
neighboring point prone to a small faster reacting catchment may be inappropriate and late.216
To evaluate the timeliness of the individual’s reactions with respect to the surrounding217
hydro-meteorological dynamic, we need to capture both routine and complex reschedul-218
ing processes and to understand how much of this is related to the hazardous hydro-219
meteorological conditions. The observation of activity rescheduling decision processes have220
been developed recently in transportation studies (Doherty 2000; Roorda et al. 2005; Clark221
and Doherty 2010). These studies often combine various survey methods as questionnaires,222
diaries and in-depth interviews together with GPS tracking in order to “capture both routine223
and complex scheduling processes as well as observe those scheduling decisions made during224
the actual execution of the schedule” (Doherty 2000). The proposed methodology for the225
post-flood investigation is derived from such method.226
b. Post-event field investigations: Method and practice227
The proposed methodology is designed to collect the pieces of evidence needed for both228
understanding the hydrological context and the behavioral responses. The following subsec-229
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tion describes the survey tools and methods that were designed to collect such datasets.230
The field campaign distinguishes two phases. In the first phase of the field campaign,231
termed “REXhydro”, the witnesses were asked about the timing and dynamic of the event.232
The main objective of this team was to determine the peak discharge estimations based on233
hydraulic considerations (Gaume et al. 2004; Gaume and Borga 2008) and to evaluate the234
related flood dynamics on a range of spatial scales, by questioning witnesses close to the235
studied river sections. This phase also allows identifying a first list of persons susceptible to236
be interviewed, in the second phase of the study, about their behaviors during the flood.237
This second phase, going by the name of “REXsocio”, aims at collecting individuals’238
own stories through semi-structured interviews. It especially focuses on collecting timing239
and spatial information related to the evolution of the environmental conditions and the240
individuals’ location and pace of activities. Its objective is to document how individuals241
switch from routine activities to emergency coping behaviors. Inspired by the activity-242
based approach, it is structured around a chronological guideline with which we invited243
interviewees to recall what they perceived from their environment, what actions they took244
and who they interacted with at the various places they stayed and while moving in-between245
places (Fig. 4). The interviewees were asked to tell their story from June 15th at noon. To246
help localizing and collecting more accurate information, we offered them the opportunity247
to locate the various places and draw their itineraries on street plans and/or road maps.248
During the June 2010 storm event, the flood hit all the downstream part of the Argens249
watershed (2700 km2). As our objectives were to test the influence of flooding dynamics on250
human behaviors and also to understand how anticipation time and adaptation strategies251
would still happen even in fast reacting catchments, we decided to focus on strongly im-252
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pacted locations within relatively small catchments where the rivers responses range from253
less than an half hour to a few hours. We concentrated our data collection efforts on three254
close-by municipalities: Figanie`res (2572 inhabitants), Trans-en-Provence (5513 inhab.) and255
Draguignan (37649 inhab.). Catchments’ sizes in the different locations surveyed ranged256
from 4 km2 to 196 km2 (Fig. 5).257
The interviews were conducted using a “snow-ball” (non-probability) sampling strategy258
in order to capture the effect of social networks in triggering emergency reactions. By crossing259
the individual stories, this method allows to confirm the timing and spatial characteristics260
of both social and hydro-meteorological event. Furthermore, the snow-ball method enables261
the reconstruction of the social network and the personal interactions emerging during the262
event.263
The survey campaign started with interviewing the contact persons listed by the REX-264
hydro team. While these people were telling us their stories we asked them to identify any265
other people with whom they were in contact (directly or indirectly) at various stages of the266
event. Then, as much as possible, we interviewed all the contacts they mentioned to get a267
more precise idea of the specific situations in which they were all involved.268
The data collected vary in nature. The first information are narratives related to the269
type of places, activities, social interactions and environmental circumstances contextualiz-270
ing each individual’s reaction. The second type of data consists of the location and time271
data necessary to relate each performed activity with the very specific environmental circum-272
stances in which they took place. A total of 38 interviews were collected. Among them 29273
were complete and reliable enough to be used for the analysis. Based on where respondents274
were when they took action, 16 interviewees were concerned with the flooding of small catch-275
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ments (less than 20 km2), and 11 persons with larger ones (approximately 200 km2) (Fig. 6).276
Two other respondents interviewed in Trans and Draguignan are part of the analysis, but277
could not be represented in Figure 6 as their reaction could not be attributed to a specific278
catchment in the study area.279
3. The possible causes of the individual’s response tim-280
ing281
This section examines a few individual’s stories that illustrate key lessons learned from282
a comparative analysis. The stories reveal some common points concerning the way people283
coped with the timing of the event. In an abductive process (Walters 2012), our purpose is284
the define the possible causes of these responses based on the observed actions performed285
during the event (the effects).286
a. A general sense of lack of anticipation287
Comparing the timing and geographic distribution of the protective actions together with288
the flood stage’s testimonies collected through the REXhydro as shown by Figure 7, shows289
that very few respondents actually anticipated the threat of the flood. As mentioned earlier,290
even if most of the protective actions started before the estimated time of the peak flows291
(considered here as the peak of danger) people did not really anticipate the flooding stages292
that would inundate the buildings.293
In this regard, the story of one of our respondents working at the Var region firefighter294
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coordination office (SDIS) in the upper catchment of the Riaille in Draguignan is particularly295
illuminating. Until 16:30, even knowing the orange vigilance level was on, the SDIS was only296
dealing with communication issues to report the crisis due to the flooding of the prison in297
a neighboring area of the city. The potential flooding of the SDIS building wasn’t foreseen298
and therefore firefighters were not prepared to secure their rescue teams and equipment. At299
16:30 the water was entering the street and then the courtyard of the SDIS five minutes300
later. The level of the water was up to the tires at 17:30 and was still rising. Around that301
time people started to move the cars to the SDIS courtyard for protection and then to climb302
upstairs as they were trapped in the SDIS building. At 18:30 telephone service was disrupted303
and no more communication was possible with the outside. The water reached the windows304
of the cars at 18:40, then the cars’ roofs at 19:50. At that time our respondent escaped the305
building swimming with the purpose of helping the imperiled people in the neighborhood.306
His dangerous rescue tasks lasted until 22:00 after he failed collecting his wife (# 13) who307
was waiting in an improvised shelter in a close-by neighborhood. Eventually, he managed to308
get back to his home that was out of the flooded area to recover.309
Several other examples show, like this one, the difficulty for people to take timely protec-310
tive actions. Even if some of them did receive official warnings (the orange vigilance in this311
case) relatively early, it didn’t trigger immediate reactions, many looked for confirmation312
of the information through other sources, and often times by looking or waiting for envi-313
ronmental cues to become obvious. Similarly, if some people started to organize themselves314
or protect their goods quite early compared to the local flooding dynamic, they somehow315
hardly manage to adapt the pace of their protective reaction to the pace of the river re-316
sponse and ended up protecting their own life at the last minute. As it was already shown317
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in previous works (Parker et al. 2009), the official warning is not a sufficient information for318
acting properly, even in the emergency services. The ability to anticipate the possible event319
is crucial but dramatically reduced in flash flood cases, and the timing of the event appears320
as a key factor.321
b. The difficulty of making sense of the situation322
Because flash flooding environmental conditions vary tremendously across space in very323
short amounts of time, it is often difficult for victims to comprehend the situation in which324
they are embedded or to imagine the variability of the threat when moving across space.325
Several stories collected during the interviews emphasize this issue.326
The story of respondent # 19 is a good example of people who learned about the catas-327
trophic flash flooding affecting their neighbors or relatives through TV news the next day.328
As an 86 year-old man living alone in his house, he didn’t learn about the flood before the329
next morning when he went to buy his bread downtown Figanie`res and discovered the dam-330
age in the main street. Fortunately, his house, located on the hill, didn’t get threatened. As331
already shown in previous study, this kind of reaction seems to mostly concern elderly who332
are often more socially isolated or marginalized (Ruin and Lutoff 2004).333
Cases # 13 and 36, related to each other, highlight other kinds of difficulties related to334
the sense-making of the situation. On the one hand, they tell us the story of a woman (#335
13) who by attempting to help her mother flooded at home got caught on the road in a very336
dangerous situation. Knowing her parents’ place is prone to flooding, she called her mother337
around 16:00 and learned there was already 2 cm of water into the house. Then she called338
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her father, who was involved as a firefighter in the flood rescue. He advised her to go and339
help her mother if it was still possible to access the place. Then she left her work place340
downtown Draguignan at 16:20 and drove toward her parents’ place located 2 km away.341
Encountering water on the way, her car stalled about 500 meters before her parents’ house.342
At first she felt safer in her stranded car until the vehicle started to float. Unfortunately, she343
was stuck inside with too much pressure on the doors to open them and no power to open344
the electric windows. After being trapped in the car for 25 minutes, she finally managed to345
restart the engine, open the electric windows and escape fighting against the current with346
the help of a man who happened to be around. On the other hand, her mother # 36 was347
accustomed to having her house flooded. She anticipated and reacted appropriately to the348
event by following her own safety procedure (we will come back on this later), starting as349
soon as 15:00 (which is very early). Nevertheless, she was thinking that only her house got350
flooded (as usual) and therefore she didn’t understand why her daughter, on the way to351
help her, wouldn’t arrive. She only learned about her daughter’s situation at 3:00 when her352
brother living in Marseille called her to give her the news that her daughter was safe.353
These latter examples shows the strong but equivocal influence of experience on pre-354
paredness and the individual’s ability to make sense of the situation and to “self-warning”355
(Parker et al. 2009).356
Several cases demonstrate the importance of being able to capture environmental cues357
in this self-warning process. For instance, reacting to the Nartuby river flood in Trans358
en Provence, respondent # 4 started to actively protect her goods and the merchandise359
from her shop together with her husband around 18:00. Her reaction was triggered by the360
accumulation of cues within the preceding hour. First she was alerted by shoppers who361
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reported road flooding and one meter of water near Trans town hall. Then the power went362
off. Finally alerted, she walked toward the river to see herself what was going on. Flooding363
was ongoing and as she said: “the old bridge over the river was trembling with people standing364
on it”. Back to her shop she found the water was starting to enter. Then, together with her365
husband, she saved important documents and climbed upstairs in their flat (located above366
the store).367
The environmental cues may become decisive because they have a significance through the368
specific history or experience of the witness. Here again, the experience of analog situations369
appears as a key factor. The story of respondents # 20 gives us a better insight about370
that process. In the case of this shopkeeper of the main street of Figanie`res, her decision to371
evacuate upstairs was prompted by hearing the creak of her entrance door that was being372
pressured by the flooding water. When she heard the noise that reminded her of the sound373
of a wildfire that she experienced before. So she got frightened about her own situation and374
of the ones of her employee and the shopkeeper next door and hurried everyone to go to375
safety together.376
However, sometimes, the experience may play an equivocal role in the making-sense377
process. Respondent # 14, a shopkeeper of the Draguignan-CA, was informed of the first378
runoff problems in her shop by a phone call from her employee as early as 13:30. At that379
time, she didn’t quit her routine and finished attending her meeting. At 15:30, because380
of traffic jam, it took her an hour to drive back to her shop to see by herself what was381
happening. When entering the store, as she was used to having her shop invaded by rain382
water coming from the surrounding parking lots and poor drainage, she first started to deal383
with the supposed obstruction of the sewer system. She finally decided to move her car to384
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higher ground. When she went out by the riverside she realized the danger was coming from385
the river and not from the parking lot. She managed to park her car on high ground and386
called her employees who had stayed in the store and told them to evacuate immediately.387
Making sense of the situation appears as a key element of the decision-making process388
in flash flood situations. The testimonies collected during the 2010 flash flood in the Var389
emphasize the essential but equivocal role of previous experiences in this process.390
c. Emerging self-organization and the emergence of a collective response391
The general lack of anticipation or the difficulty of making sense of the situation were392
hopefully often compensated by self-organization or emerging social interactions.393
A first example of self-organization comes with the story of respondent # 36 (already394
evoked). Because her home had already been frequently flooded (and maybe because she is395
married to a firefighter) she was well prepared for flooding and had made her own “flooding396
checklist”. She started, as early as 15:00, to follow the various steps by: i) checking the level397
of the water that was still 40 cm below the level of the house, ii) requesting that the parents398
of the three children she takes care of come to pick them up, iii) driving the three cars to399
higher ground, iv) securing her important papers and eventually calling her husband to ask400
him what to do when the water entered the house at 17:15. On his advice, she evacuated401
her single-story house together with the last 2 year-old child whose mother was not able to402
pick up fast enough. They went to the first floor of her mother’s house next door.403
As for the emergence of a collective response, it is interesting to look at three testimonies404
(# 30, 31, 32) recollecting a story that happened in Draguignan-CA. It shows how much405
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“unofficial” warnings or improvised emergency action may be influential in lessening the406
impact of flash flood events. The action started with respondent # 31 who interpreted the407
environmental cues of refrigerators floating in the river as a serious indicator of danger and408
initiated the process of protecting himself at 16:50. On his way to evacuating he went to409
the shop nearby (# 32) as he knew one of the employees working there. When he saw the410
people trying to keep the water (which was already about 30 cm deep) from entering the411
store, he realized they weren’t understanding the situation correctly and argued for them412
to evacuate with him. Nearly simultaneously, respondent # 30, passing by on his way to413
evacuate warned them too, saying “if you don’t leave you will die”. Finally around 17:45, #414
32 and the other employees agreed to take protection following # 31 upstairs of a neighbor’s415
warehouse.416
Beyond the simple interactions between people, this story illustrates the emergence of417
collective response which takes place when individuals need to improvise a reaction to face418
unexpected circumstances together with people who are in the same location at that time.419
Emergent groups may be composed of people who already knew each other before the flood420
as it was partly the case in the previous story. This is more likely to happen in places where421
people have their habits like home or work places. But collective response also happens422
among people who have never interacted before (see case # 13 described in section 3b.) and423
may never interact again after. As seen in case # 13, this might happen when people are424
traveling, specially when moving outside of their usual area of practice.425
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d. Conflicting priorities and the beneficial influence of a third party426
Sometimes, even when the threat becomes obvious, environmental cues are not even427
acknowledged nor considered sufficient by those at risk to overcome their daily life’s priorities.428
This was the case for many of our respondents.429
The story of respondent # 32 in Draguignan-CA also shows that the man was still in a430
“routine” mode while other respondents around already started to take protective measures431
(Fig. 6). At that time, this business owner and director was in his store busy dealing with432
the installation of newly arrived merchandise. He only agreed to evacuate 30 minutes later433
after being warned by several people and after the water had largely inundated the shop.434
As another example demonstrating both the difficulty of making sense of the situation and435
prioritizing work’s responsibility, two employees (only one was interviewed) of a store ended436
up being in a dangerous situation by spending too much time trying to save merchandise.437
Both women were working when the water started flooding the shop. At first they thought438
it was only runoff because of the slope of the parking lot. Their reaction was to protect the439
merchandise by raising it up out of the flood water’s reach. They only felt the need to run440
away when the water reached their hips about an hour later and after their employer, who441
they talked with on the phone, advised them to leave. By the time they escaped on foot,442
cars were already floating around. Luckily, they finally managed to reach an hotel uphill443
that ended up serving as an improvised shelter for the area.444
A similar and even more striking case happened in Figanie`res and shows how much the445
presence of a detached party can fortunately influence the decision making process. The446
story involved a young pregnant business owner (# 25) accompanied by a friend (and client447
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whom we didn’t get to interview) and a municipal employee who came to help (# 27). The448
two women were trapped in the respondent’s shop located downstairs from the main street.449
The flood water running along the street was about 0.5 meter deep (above the street level)450
which meant nearly 1.5 meters above the floor of the shop2. The only way to escape the shop451
was to open the window where the municipal employee was standing and try to convince452
the women to leave. From the interview we understood that the business owner didn’t want453
to open the window because she wasn’t thinking of her own security but, rather, she was454
afraid that her newly-started business would be damaged. It was thanks to her friend who455
had no emotional nor financial involvement with the business that they finally opened the456
window, broke through the wall of water thanks to the help of the man outside, and were457
able to survive unharmed.458
4. The pace of individual responses459
a. The individual responses dataset460
Based on this first analysis and inspired by activity-based analyses in mobility and trans-461
portation studies, the narratives were coded to reflect the various type of situations reported.462
The variable called “place” was coded to show the type of social places where people were463
located such as the workplace, a dwelling or a public building. From all the answers received464
we distinguished 8 categories (Fig. 8). We hypothesized that the type of place where peo-465
ple are situated might influence individual responses to warnings as it has been argued in466
2the shop is located in the basement of the building
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previous research that coming back home and gathering the family there is one of the first467
drivers of behaviors during a crisis (Drabek 1986; Mileti 1995). The variable called “ac-468
tivity” codes the type of behaviors. Four main categories were selected with the objective469
of capturing the transition from routine activities that are qualified as “usual” and crisis470
activities including three gradual states that qualified in previous work as “information”,471
“organization” and “protection” (Creutin et al. 2009). Three more categories were added:472
1) “recovery” was attributed to post-emergency action, 2) “in danger” was used to indicate473
that the individual’s situation was life threatening3, 3) “travel” was used to emphasize pe-474
riods when respondents were moving between stations or were in transit as those might be475
factors of enhanced exposition to flash flooding and lesser perception of danger (Ruin et al.476
2008, 2007). Under the categories of information, protection and travel, sub-categories were477
created to precisely identify the various goals of such activities. The list of the categories478
and sub-categories employed for the coding are listed in Figure 8.479
The datafile issued from the coding of the interviews is structured around three distinct480
sets of variables. The first one gathers socio-demographic data about the respondent: gender,481
age and profession. The second one gathers six variables describing the stations or fixed482
locations where the respondent spent time and the related action(s). These variables include:483
latitude and longitude, starting time and ending time, place-code and activity-code. A block484
of station data is entered each time a new location, place or activity has been reported and485
can be easily delimited in time. This means that if the person stayed at home the entire486
time but declared, for instance, that he or she switched his/her activity from daily routine487
to an organizational stage at a certain time, a new block of data is entered with the same488
3according to the interpretation of the researcher based on the description the victim made of the situation
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geo-location and place-code but with a different activity-code reflecting its switch to an489
organizational activity during this specific period. The third set of 2 variables codes for the490
travel modes (4 modalities) and purposes (7 modalities) (Fig. 8) occurring in-between the491
stations or locations. Therefore one person might have a pattern of data block describing a492
series of stations and travels.493
b. Dynamics of the hydro-meteorological event as a reference494
In order to compare the type and pace of individual responses, we used the reference495
of the flood timing, common for a specific location. The flood phases have been identified496
thanks to the data collected through the REXhydro (Payrastre et al. 2012). A comprehensive497
review of meteorological and hydrological data sets was conducted before proceeding to field498
measurements. Information about high water marks and the floods’ timing were collected499
in the field a few days after the event by the CETE Me´diterrane´e (CETE 2011)500
Estimation of maximum peak discharges based on measurements of river sections, high501
water marks and estimation of flow velocity reported by witnesses are the result of the502
REXhydro field investigations (Douvinet et al. 2011; Payrastre et al. 2012) according to the503
method developed by Gaume and Borga (2008) and Borga et al. (2008). The hydrograms504
in Figure 7 are issued from distributed rainfall-runoff simulations (CINECAR model) using505
different “Curve Numbers” (CN) of the SCS (Soil Conservation Service) model with the506
value in the range of 35 (retention capacity of the soils up to 472 mm) to 100 (constant507
runoff coefficient equal to 100%) (Gaume and Bouvier 2004; Gaume et al. 2004).508
According to radar data, on June 15, 2010 rainfall was light over the areas of interest from509
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the end of the night until 10:30 local time4 in the morning causing a rain amount of 5 mm.510
Then the intensity increased significantly between 10:30 and 12:30 causing an additional511
amount of 15 mm. Starting from 12:30 on June 15, 2010 and up to 20:00, steady rainfall512
intensities around 30 mm.h−1 were observed with several peaks of more than 50 mm.h−1.513
The total precipitation at 20:00 was respectively 175, 220 and 205 mm over the Figanie`res,514
Draguignan and Trans watersheds. The rainfall intensities remained around 8 mm.h−1 a515
few hours after 20:00, and weakened during the night. The rain finally stopped at 06:00 am516
on June 16th. Ultimately, 258, 306, and 311 mm were respectively estimated in Figanie`res,517
Draguignan and Trans.518
According to the hydrological post-event investigations, the dynamics of the floods in519
each location were quite different. The flooding of the small catchment of the Tuilie`re river520
at the outlet of Figanie`res village (4 km2) started around 17:00 and lasted about 30 minutes521
(Fig. 7) with fast moving water overtopping the main street of the village by 1m60. A few522
kilometers further down the village, at the outlet of Figanie`res-Saint Esprit (19 km2), the523
flood seemed to have started slightly later and the inundation was reported to have lasted524
until 7:00 the next morning. The flooding of the Riaille seemed to have started a little later525
(30 mn to 1h) than the flooding of the main river, which began at 15:30 on the 15th. The526
Riaille peak flow happened around 17:00 and 18:00, while the Nartuby was at his maximum527
between 16:30 and 18:15. In Draguignan, 10 people died from the flood and at least one528
casualty was clearly attributed to the Riaille. Most testimonies about flood stage indicate529
the flooding began Tuesday June 15th after 15:00 and finished on Wednesday morning June530
4we choose to express dates in local time (TU + 2h) instead of UTC time to be consistent with the rest
of the paper in which dates refer to social activities
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16th. In this village the Nartuby river rose its maximum around 18:00 and stayed at its peak531
(or have a second pic) until 23:00 (Fig. 7). The speed of the flow of the Nartuby entering a532
gorge in Trans-en-Provence killed 5 persons, destroyed a few buildings close to the river and533
triggered a landfall affecting the cemetery.534
c. Coping response versus hydrometeorology535
To allow a comparison of the coping response and the flooding dynamics in each catch-536
ment, Figure 7 displays the chronology of each respondent’s activity according to the location537
where they started to take protective actions.538
At the time protective activities started 16 respondents had to cope with fast reacting539
catchments: 14 in Figanie`res related to the flooding of the Tuillie`re river basin and 2 in540
downtown Draguignan because of the Riaille river. In Figanie`res, 10 respondents started to541
react within the same timeframe of about one hour (16:15-17:30) (Fig. 7). Compared to542
the flood stages reports from the CETE, most of the protective actions started after 16:30,543
anticipating the time of the peak flow by at least 15 minutes. Two respondents reacted544
either simultaneously or late and three respondents (# 17, 18 and 19) didn’t need to take545
protection measures because they were out of the flooded area. The only two testimonies546
we have in downtown Draguignan show a very different timing with a first, early reaction at547
15:00 and a second 5 hours later.548
Eleven respondents located near the Nartuby river were concerned by the flooding of549
larger catchments. In the larger catchment of Trans en Provence (196 km2), the 6 behavioral550
responses are spread over two hours and a half with most people responding before 16:30. In551
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Draguignan-CA drained by the Nartuby-184 km2 basin, the 5 protective actions happened552
in a time window of two hours but most of them started after 16:30. According to the553
flood stage reports and peak flow simulation, flood responses seemed to have been a little554
more anticipated in Trans than in Draguignan-CA. When the interviewees initiated coping555
responses, 16 of the respondents were at work, 9 were outside buildings including 5 traveling556
either by car, by bus or walking and 2 were at home.557
To give an overview of the coping response and its environmental circumstances, Figure558
8 displays the proportion of interviewees by type of activity over time together with the559
rainfall intensity over the Trans watershed. According to the figure, the event is divided into560
four periods that correspond to the evolution of the hydro-meteorological context.561
The first phase is before 14:00 with a first important precipitation sequence cumulating562
about 60 mm but without any serious runoff or river reaction. The orange vigilance level563
launched by Me´te´o France the day before seems to have slightly increased awareness but it564
had negligible effects on people’s preparation. In fact on June 15th at noon nearly all the565
respondents (91%) were immersed in routine activities. From 12:15 to 13:45, the number566
of people in “routine” mode decreased to the profit of the “information” mode peaking567
between 13:30 and 13:45 with 24% of the respondents. The “information” activity increased568
until 13:35 and matches the first peak in rainfall intensities (which occurred around 12:45).569
During that period, only 6 people have expressed some kind of awareness related to the hydro-570
meteorological event. Four of them explicitly said they became aware of Me´te´o France storm571
watch (orange vigilance level) for the Var area when they were watching the mid-day news572
on TV at home during their lunch break. According to what they said, this information573
didn’t affect their plans for the day or their level of concern. One of them did recommend574
27
that visiting relatives should bring boots and raincoats. One person (# 31), who had a direct575
upper view on the Nartuby river from his working place, felt concerned by the environmental576
cues. Respondent # 14 was warned by a phone call from one of her employees reporting the577
first runoff problems in her shop that was situated a few meters from the Nartuby river in578
Draguignan-CA.579
Phase 2, between 14:00 and 16:30 corresponds to the flood generating precipitation se-580
quence that added 90mm to the first phase. During that period intense surface runoffs were581
already taking place in some areas. The number of people switching to protective action only582
starts to increase at 15:00, shortly following a second and major rise in rainfall intensities583
and just before the occurrence of the first peak flow at 15:30 in the lower part of the Nar-584
tuby catchment. In total, only three persons reported that they switched to an organization585
mode and seven others to a protection mode. As shown by the pink dashed curve represent-586
ing the cumulated percentage, the number of imperiled respondents starts to rise slowly at587
15:45 as one person (# 12) found herself in a dangerous situation in the commercial area of588
Draguignan, not far from the confluence of the Riaille and the Nartuby rivers.589
Comparing the timing and geographic distribution of the protective actions together with590
the flood stage’s testimonies collected through the REXhydro, Figure 7 shows that for some591
respondents protective actions were mostly synchronized with the beginning of the water592
rise. This was the case for respondents # 12, 13, 29, 30, 34, 36 in the Draguignan area and593
# 26 in Figanie`res. Based on those testimonies, most protective actions only started when594
some water entered the work place or dwelling where people were located. One exception595
was # 13 whose first protective action was to drive to her mother’s place to help her dealing596
with the flooding. All the other respondents’ reactions were to elevate merchandises above597
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the flood level and/or to move their car to higher ground. This is the only type (code 42 on598
fig. 6) of protective actions that took place during that phase. Our respondents dedicated599
quite some time (from half hour to two hours) to this activity which often ended up them600
being in dangerous situations, either during this same phase (# 12) or phase 3 (# 29, 30).601
In Figanie`res, even if few people started to feel concern about the environmental cues, only602
one person (# 26) reached an organization stage during this period by first trying to figure603
out the first runoff problems in front of her shop and then raising the goods in her shop as604
the water entered.605
Phase 3, from 16:30 to 18:15, corresponds to the flood danger outburst constituting a606
powerful “pace maker”. This phase cumulated 40 more millimeters of rainfall to the previous607
one for a total amount of 70 to 200 mm from the east to the western part of the area. It608
triggered major peak flows in all of the studied rivers. This period follows a drop of the609
“routine”, “information” and “organization” curves to the profit of the “protection” curves610
that reaches an inflection point around 16:45 time when the switching rate is at its highest.611
In total during that period 18 respondents were forced to take protective actions against the612
inundation, including three only switching to an organizational stage. Most of them were613
either in Figanie`res (12) or in Draguignan (4). Because of the time of the day most people614
were at work when they had to take protection and most of the dangerous travels during that615
phase were related to the purpose of protecting oneself or rescuing someone. In Figanie`res,616
officials started to become aware of the abnormality of the situation around 16:30 when they617
started to get several phone calls from inhabitants reporting runoff problems in the main618
street of the village. The first rescue operations (using municipality resources only) started619
shortly after. It involved few local officials and employees walking toward the locations of620
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the reported problems to figure out what to do. They ended up rescuing people out of621
dangerous situations as the example of # 27 helping # 25 to escape the flooding of her shop622
(as described in the previous section). In Figanie`res village the flood was extremely localized623
mainly affecting the main street. The flooding was so fast5 that even if some people tried624
to secure their goods at first they rapidly realized that they had to take shelter by going625
upstairs when that was possible. In the commercial area of Draguignan, the level of the626
water started to be critical before 17:00. Testimonies show that employees and shopkeepers627
had somehow to make sense and manage the dangerous situations by themselves (# 14, 30,628
31, 32). Two respondents located in Trans en Provence started to take protective action soon629
after 18:00 as the water started to enter their shops. Both tried to protect some of their630
merchandise. Interviewee # 33 was with his parents who were the owners of the shop. They631
carried on this task until when the water was as high as 60 cm. They eventually escaped by632
driving back to their home that was close by on a hill and luckily they followed a route that633
was free of flooding.634
The number of imperiled people increased steadily between 16:30 and 17:30. At that635
time 25% (7 persons) of our sample can be counted as “imperiled”. Two of them, immersed636
in their jobs (# 2b & 7) were literally surprised and forced to escape as a survival reflex.637
Four others (# 25, 29, 30, 31) evacuated quite late in trying to secure goods or worrying less638
about their own safety than material losses. Another one didn’t feel the danger coming (#639
34) as she felt protected in her car. During that period, as illustrated by the stories described640
before, self-organization and emerging interpersonal interactions were quit common. Most641
of our respondents managed to get out of trouble by interacting with other people, some642
5testimonies indicate that the level of water in the main street rose 1.10 m in 15 minutes
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of whom were strangers but who happened to be at the right place and time to help out.643
Sometimes interpersonal interactions only helped realizing the danger and the emergency of644
the situation; sometimes physical was needed.645
Finally phase 4, starting at 18:15 is characterized by the slow rising pace of recovery pro-646
gressively replacing protective actions. It also includes the last two precipitation sequences647
maintaining the peak flow of the Nartuby in Trans en Provence until 23:00. During this648
phase the water level was still rising in some areas, while the Tuilie`re was going back to its649
riverbed in Figanie`res. The ratio of people in protection peaks at 18:15 at the same time as650
the third rainfall peak, when the number of interviewed people performing usual activities651
is under 10%. Later the protection curve displays smaller peaks that also correspond very652
well with peaks in rainfall intensities possibly illustrating enhanced awareness. Then, when653
the protection rate decreases the recovery curve starts to rise quite steadily around at 18:45,654
to finally stabilize at 23:00. The recovery process is mainly happening in Figanie`res which is655
coherent with the REXhydro data, relating the fast onset and drop in of the Tuilie`re river.656
During that phase, at 20:00 and 21:00 two more people got endangered while traveling.657
5. Conclusion658
This paper proposes a methodology of post flood field investigation exploring the link659
between crisis behavioral response and hydro-meteorological dynamics in space and time.660
It aims at contextualizing a limit set of coping responses observed with respect to local661
hydro-meteorological conditions. The analysis of the collected data associates abductive662
and activity-based approaches. The first one enables to identify the possible contextual663
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factors influencing individual responses to flash flood. The second one offers a framework664
for a comparative analysis of the pace of the sequence and type of actions using the flood665
dynamic as a common reference.666
The proposed methodology is useful to compare the pace and timeliness of the social667
responses across several flood events’ dynamics and social contexts. Some first attempts668
of such comparisons were already made across European countries (Creutin et al. 2009;669
Parker et al. 2009). However, they highlighted the problem of the heterogeneity of the670
methods used for data collecting. The proposed methodology contributes to address this671
needs of standardized and adequate social and physical data collection, not available in672
existing disaster databases. The use of a chronological guideline for the interviews may673
appear as a constraint, inducing a loss of richness in the narratives. However, it offers the674
opportunity to handle these narratives with the activity-based approach and to initiate a675
quantitative analysis of the timeliness and pace of the sequence of activities with respect to676
the local flood dynamics.677
Nevertheless such methodology still faces some challenges. One of them is related to the678
timing of the field campaign and survey data collection in order to limit the bias associated679
with the recollection process. In fact, it is well-known that human perception and memory680
vary across individuals and with the length of time between the perceptual experience and the681
moment when the survey takes place. Therefore, the most appropriate moment for collecting682
the data still remains to be defined based on psycho-cognitive considerations. Another683
challenge that still needs further considerations is related to the proposed categorization of684
activities. The definition of the categories is inspired by the literature (Drabek 1986; Lindell685
and Perry 1992, 2004; Mileti 1995; Creutin et al. 2009; Parker et al. 2009). But the process686
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of categorization is based on the researcher’s interpretation of the narratives and has to be687
improved with a more detailed characterization of the criteria used to associate the fragments688
of narrative to one specific activity. This work is currently under progress.689
Eventually, the application of the proposed methodology on the Var event (15th of June,690
2010) allowed to identify some possible causes of the individual responses. The difficulty to691
switch from daily activities to warning responses is one of the reason and can be explained692
by the possible conflicts of priorities between routine and exceptional circumstances. The693
difficulty to make sense of environmental cues in the case of insufficient official warning694
appears also as a possible cause of delay in the individual response to flash flooding. The695
study also reveals a form of individual’s self-organization and the emergence of small group696
responses that may involve different type of social ties depending on the type of place where697
they take place. Finally, the Var data confirms the role of contextual factors, as defined by698
Parker et al. (2009): the timing of the hydro-meteorological event, its severity, the experience699
of flood seem to be essential in the ability of individuals to make sense of the situation and700
to adapt their activities.701
The activity-based approach enables to define the socio-hydro-meteorological event into702
four phases. The first one starts with the intense rain, and mixes routine activities and search703
of information. The second one comes with intense surface runoffs, encouraging individuals704
to organize themselves and sometime to engage in protective actions. The first imperiled705
people appear also during this phase. The third phase comes with the flood danger outburst706
and is accompanied with the drop of routine, or even information or organization activities707
to the profit of protective actions. The first rescues occur in this phase. Finally, the fourth708
phase is characterized by a maintained peak flow and a still high level of protective action,709
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with sometimes recovery activities, depending of the flood dynamics. Even thought flooding710
dynamics were quite different according to the catchment size, Dangerous situations and lack711
of anticipation happened both in Figanie`res’s very small catchment leaving only minutes for712
reaction and in the larger catchments of the Nartuby river that reacted relatively slower but713
still rapidly enough to qualify as flash flood.714
The use of the methodology in other case studies will help complementing the catego-715
rization of the individual pace of adaptation. Based on this categorization, it is possible to716
consider the integration of individual pace of adaptation and hydrological responses into a717
modeling of flood event dynamics, in order to better understand the role played by the social718
and hydrological parameters and eventually, to forecast the possible human impacts of flash719
floods.720
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1 Introduction
Western Mediterranean regions are favored locations for major heavy precipitating
events. Through the years, devastating flash floods have been responsible for human ca-
sualties and severe material damages. As all coastal areas of the western Mediterranean
region, southern France is aﬀected by extreme flash flood events (Fig. 1a), like those of
Vaison-la-Romaine, Aude, Gard and Cévennes [Nuissier et al., 2007].
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Localisation of Draguignan within (a) Mediterranean flash flood events and (b) the
Var region.
On 15 and 16 June 2010, the area of Draguignan, located in the Var department, (see
Fig. 1b) was hit by torrential rain (over 400 mm in 36 hours), which lead to important
flood causing 25 casualties and damages evaluated at 1,3 billion $. A map of cumulative
surface rainfall, including Naturby watershed (the river flowing through Draguignan) is
represented on Fig. 2.
Unlike its associated meteorological event (thank’s to radar and remote sensing data)
flash floods are diﬃcult to analyse directly on the field, in the sense that they are so
intense and short that it is diﬃcult to evaluate the magnitude of the hydrological event.
For instance, the flow can be so strong that any discharge measurement station would
be destroyed by the flood. Also, those event are almost unpredictable (spatially and
temporally) and as they are extreme, they exceed the range of valid estimation on
rating curves.
This is the reason why Post Event Investigations (PEI) are made on the field. A first
PEI (in French, REx) devoted to hydrological post-event gauging (REx Hydro) has been
carried out in October 2010 by the LTHE [Vannier, 2010]. Later, a hydro-social PEI has














Fig. 1. Location of the city of Draguignan within the Mediterranean area and together with
other major historic flash flood events. Annotated from Nuissier et al. (2008)
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Fig. 2. Total precipitation amount from June 2010, 15th 6:00 UTC to 16th 6:00 UTC. From



















































Fig. 3. Hyetograph at the Me´te´o-France station of “Les Arcs-sur-Argens”.
46
Fig. 4. Semi-structured interview framework used for the REXsocio to collect 29 testimonies
in 3 municipalities affected by the June 2010 floods in the Var area.
47
(CETE)
Fig. 5. Distribution of the number of interviews collected (in parenthesis) in each catchment
(white lines) and outlets (white dots). The black isolines display the total rainfall accumu-
lation over the event. The small yellow squares show the location of flood stage timings
collected through the first round of the post event investigations. The location of the fatal











































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 6. Details of the type of activity performed by selected interviewees over time. Rainfall
intensity and Me´te´o-France vigilance levels illustrate the evolution of environmental circum-
stances over the study area. In addition flood stages observations issued from the REXhydro







































































































































Fig. 7. Space-Time distribution of the hydrological and behavioral data for June 15th, 2010.
Dots show where protective actions took place and the color code displays the starting time
of each individual’s action. Colored squares show the time of the runoff peak flow estimated
from hydrological post-event investigations. Related peak flow simulations from Payrastre
et al. (2012) for the Nartuby and Tuillie`re rivers are displayed and the timing of protective







Work or school 1 Usual 1
Home 2 Information 2
On the road 3    I. incoming 21
  Driving 31    I. outgoing 22
  Walking 32 Organization/vigilance 3
  Zodiac 33 Protection 4
  Bus 34    Adapt/Cancel activity 41
Relatives or neighbours 4    Goods protection 42
Emergency management center 5    Rescue/help someone 43
Public building 6    Climb upstairs 44
Improvised Shelter 7    Shelter 45
Outdoor 8    Evacuation 46




   As usual 71
   For information purposes 72
   For Vigilance purposes 73
   For protection 74
   For recovery 75
   Dangerous travel 76
   Adapted travel 77
Fig. 8. List of the color and numeric codes used to process the qualitative data collected







































































































































































































































Fig. 9. Time evolution of the percentage of respondents by type of activity and correspond-
ing areal rainfall intensity and time of peak flows over the study area (196 km2). Time step
is 15 minutes.
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